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It appears as if Jones is morally responsible for his action, although he could not have done otherwise (in virtue of Black's presence). If this is so, then PAP is called into question (along with the argument that employs it to get to the conclusion that causal determinism is incompatible with moral responsibility).
The "Frankfurt-style" examples have evoked considerable discussion. One general form of response to the examples is that, despite the initial appearance, there really are alternative possibilities. This kind of response comes in many different specific versions, but the general idea is that one can find at least some alternative possibility -some "flicker of freedom"-even in the most sophisticated "Frankfurt-style" example. Typically, the proponent of the flicker of freedom response to Frankfurt concedes that the agent cannot do otherwise (cannot perform a different action from the one he actually performs), but insists that there is something else that is the ground of moral responsibility and to which there is indeed an alternative possibility. Perhaps this "something else"-this flicker of freedom-is the agent's performing the action "in the normal sort of way" (that is, not as a result of Black's intervention), or the agent's volition to perform the action, or the event particular (finely individuated) brought about by the agent in acting, and so forth. The flicker theorist thus defends something like PAP-some principle that links moral responsibilities to alternative possibilities of some sort or another.3 James W. Lamb4 gives a strikingly different response to Frankfurt: he does not even concede that the relevant agent (say, Jones) cannot perform a different action from the one he actually performs. That is, Lamb argues that in the Frankfurt-style examples there is no reason to believe that the relevant agent cannot do other than he actually does. If Lamb is correct about this, then Frankfurt and the vast majority of commentators on his work are wrong about the examples, and the examples pose no threat to PAP.
Lamb offers an "informal" argument for his view that it is a "fallacy" to interpret the Frankfurt-style examples in the "standard" way, that is, as containing an agent who cannot do otherwise. He also attributes to Frankfurt a kind of reasoning in support of the standard interpretation of the examples which he shows to be fallacious. We believe Lamb is mistaken in his reasoning in his informal 3 A careful discussion and evaluation of the flicker approach is beyond the scope of this paper. We wish simply to register our view that this approach is unsatisfying. Although we are willing to admit that one can identify certain sorts of alternative possibilities, even in the fanciest Frankfurt-style examples, it is implausible to think that these alternative possibilities play the role required by the flicker theorist; that is, it is implausible that these alternative possibilities ground the ascriptions of moral responsibility. Put slightly differently, even if there are alternative possibilities in the Frankfurt-type cases, it does not seem natural or appealing to suppose that it is in virtue of the presence of these alternatives that the agent is morally responsible for his actions. But consider now an ordinary electrical circuit without a fuse. And suppose that it never actually is subject to a voltage surge and thus never actually overheats. Nevertheless, it is reasonable to say that the circuit could overheat and start a fire. Now imagine that we add a fuse to the circuit. Again, suppose that the circuit is never actually subject to a voltage surge. What has changed, given the installation of the fuse? It is now true (as it was not before) that, if the triggering event (a voltage surge) were to occur, the circuit would be prevented from overheating. Has anything else changed? Lamb thinks not. Indeed, his analysis of the Frankfurt examples commits him to the view that the circuit can still overheat in the absence of the voltage surge even though the fuse has been installed. But this is surely false. Once the fuse is installed, the circuit cannot overheat (even in the absence of the voltage surge).5 Therefore, Lamb's parallel claim that in the absence of the triggering event Jones can do otherwise must be false.
Indeed, Lamb's reasoning can be shown to be faulty by a whole host of examples involving the installation of a safety device. Consider, for example, the sort of "surge protector" one can buy at a hardware store to protect against power surges. Let us suppose that before you install your surge protector you do not actually have any power surges and thus never have the depressing experience of los-ing material you have been typing into your computer. Nevertheless, there is a straightforward sense in which you could lose some unsaved material in this manner. After the installation of the surge protector, it is not only true that, were a power surge to occur, the surge protector would prevent your computer from suddenly going off; it is also plausible to think that (now that the surge protector is in place) you cannot lose unsaved material in this manner, even in the absence of a power surge.
Of course, "can" (and "possibility") and "cannot" (and "impossibility") are notoriously obscure modalities. But one very plausible way of understanding them is in terms of scenarios of certain sorts. More specifically, in order to support a claim that x can happen (or that x is possible), given circumstances a, b, and c, one must be able to describe a coherent scenario (holding the actual natural laws fixed) in which a, b, and c obtain and x happens. Similarly, if it is true that x cannot happen (or that x is impossible), given circumstances a, b, and c, then there must be no coherent description of such a scenario in which a, b, and c obtain and x happens.
Once the fuse is installed (and supposing it works properly), there is no coherent description of a scenario in which the circuit overheats; thus, the circuit cannot overheat. And once the surge protector is installed (and supposing it works properly), there is no coherent description of a scenario in which you lose unsaved material as a result of a power surge; thus, you cannot lose material in this way. By the same token, once Black is restored to the Frankfurtstyle example, there is no coherent description of a scenario in which Jones does other than he actually does; thus, Jones cannot do otherwise. I do not know whether Frankfurt intended this passage as an argument, but it can certainly be taken that way, i.e., as the argument that Jones cannot do otherwise because he performs the same action whether or not he acts on his own (521-2).
It is evident, then, that Lamb's informal reasoning about Frankfurt's examples is mistaken. Let us now turn to Lamb's diagnosis of
Lamb proceeds to point out that the general sort of argument suggested here is fallacious. That is, the following general form of argumentation is invalid: either p is true or p is not true. If p is true, then x occurs. And if p is not true, then x occurs. Therefore, x must occur. This kind of argument is invalid-some sort of modal fallacy -because it may be the case (for example) that even though p is true, x might not occur.7
We agree that the form of reasoning identified by Lamb is invalid. But we deny that Frankfurt employs it or is in any way committed to it. When Frankfurt says, "But whether We have argued that a certain natural way of understanding the modalities "can," "possibility," "cannot," and "impossibility" helps to expose precisely why Lamb is incorrect in saying that the relevant agents can do otherwise in the Frankfurt examples. A sign that he is incorrect is that this view would commit him to obviously unacceptable results in a class of cases involving the installation of safety devices. Further, this way of understanding the modalities points to a way of interpreting Frankfurt's own reasoning on behalf of the standard view of these examples (according to which the relevant agent cannot do otherwise); on this interpretation, Frankfurt-or the proponent of the view that his examples call PAP into question -is not guilty of an obvious modal confusion or fallacy.
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